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L Fas
On February 5, 1997, Bobby Wayne Swisher ("Swisher") entered a florist
shop in Augusta County, Virginia and told an employee of the store, Dawn
McNees Snyder ("Snyder"), that he had a gun concealed in his coat pocket.
Swisher then took Synder to a desolate field near the South River. Swisher
forced Snyder to perform oral sex and remove her clothes. He then raped her
and made her perform oral sex again. After she put her clothes back on, Swisher
cut her face and throat with a butcher's knife. While Snyder was still alive,
Swisher threw her into the river. When Snyder began to crawl up the bank,
Swisher fled in fear. Her body was found on February21, 1997. The next day,
Swisher confessed the details of the murder to two of his friends. His friends,
Clarence Henry Ridgeway, Jr. ("Ridgeway") and Shane Knous, became alarmed
and notified the authorities. Subsequently, Swisher confessed to the crime. After
a jury trial, the jury found Swisher guilty of capital murder, abduction, rape and
forcible sodomy. The jury fixed the penalty at death, and the trial judge so
sentenced him on February 18, 1998.1
The Supreme Court of Virginia denied Swisher's direct appeal, which was
consolidated with the automatic review of his death sentence in the Supreme
Court of Virginia.2 Next, Swisher filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the Supreme Court of Virginia but was again denied relief.3 Swisher then sought
habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia.4 Once more, Swisher was unsuccessful.' Finally, Swisher sought a
certificate of appealability ("CX)A") from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit.6 Swisher argued that the Commonwealth did not provide
1. Swisher v. True, 325 F.3d 225,226-28 (4th ar. 2003), wt deni4 123 S. Ct. 2668 (2003).
2. Id at 228; Swisher v. Commonwealth, 506 S.E.2d 763, 773 (Va. 1998); see VA. CODE
ANN. S 17.1-313(A) (Mchie 2003) (stating that "[a] sentence of death, upon the judgment thereon
becoming final in the circuit court, shall be reviewed on the record by the Supreme Court").
3. Suiskr, 325 F.3d at 228.
4. Id; see U.S.C S 2254 (2000) (allowing federal courts to entertain writs of habeas corpus
by persons in custody pursuant to state court judgments).
5. Suishe, 325 F.3d at 228.
6. Id
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him with Brady material and knowingly elicited perjured testimony from a wit-
ness.7 He also claimed his counsd's assistance was ineffective.8
Shortly thereafter, the Fourth Circuit received a request for a COA arising
from a North Carolina case, State v Rozfey.9 Around 1:00 a.m. on March 24,
1992, Raymond Dayle Rowsey ("Rowsey") and his half brother Raymond Lee
Steele went to a local Circle K convenience store. After playing video games and
examining a movie display, Rowsey approached the checkout counter and
purchased two bags of M&M's. Rowsey next produced a gun from his coat,
pointed it at the clerk and clicked the weapon without discharging it. Rowsey
turned to his half brother with a smile and said he had scared the clerk with a
water gun. Rowsey turned back to the clerk and shot him in the face with what
was indeed a real gun. He then leaned over the counter and shot him again.
After running around the counter, Rowsey fired at least two more shots and
kicked the victim several times in the back of the head. The two fled the store
with $54.00 in cash and several adult magazines. When Rowsey's half brother
tried to spend a recorded two-dollar bill obtained from the store, he was appre-
hended and eventually confessed. The jury convicted Rowsey of first-degree
murder and armed robbery and sentenced him to death.10
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the
conviction and the sentence." After the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari, Rowsey filed a motion for appropriate relief ("MAR") in North
Carolina state court, which was denied. 2 The Supreme Court of North Carolina
denied certiorari"3 Thereafter, Rowsey filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina, which the district court dismissed u on a magistrate's recommenda-
tion.14 The district court did not issue a GOA.' Rowseysought a COA from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Crcuit seeking, iner a//a, review
for judicial bias, ineffective assistance of counsel, and imposition of a death




9. Rowseyv. Lee, 327 F.3d 335 (4th CQr. 2003); State v. Rowsey, 472 S.E.2d 903,903 (N.G
1996).
10. Rome 327 F.3d at 337-39.
11. Rome 472 S.E.2d at 919.




16. Id at 339-41.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit declined to issue
a GOA for any of Swisher's claims."' The Fourth Circuit did, however, issue a
GOA for Rowsey's claim that the trial judge's comments during the trial evinced
a bias against Rowsey.8 Nonetheless, the court upheld the district court's
determination because Rowsey failed to demonstrate that the alleged bias de-
prived him of a fair trial.' The court declined to grant a GOA for any of
Rowsey's remaining claims. °
IML A mbsz
A. Pmaduna Swrnza
Because the district court did not issue a GOA, Swisher, like Rowsey, could
appeal only if at least one judge on a three judge panel of the court of appeals
granted him a COA." A OA can issue "only if the applicant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right."' In Slak v
McDanid,23 the United States Supreme Court held that to meet this burden a
habeas petitioner must "sho[w] that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or
for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were 'adequate to deserve encouragement to
17. Suihq, 325 F.3d at 233.
18. RoueK 327 F.3d at 341.
19. Id at 342.
20. Id at 345. One of the remaining claims that the court refused to hear was an equal
protection claim based on the alleged equal culpability of Rowsey's co-defendan. Rowsey argued
that the trial court's application of North Carolina General Statutes section 15A-2000 denied him
his equal protection rights. Id at 342; se also N.C GEN. STAT. S 15A-2000 (2001) (detailing
procedure for separate penaltyphase after judgment of guilt in capital tria]). Despite equal culpabi-
ity, Rowsey claimed that his co-defendant was offered a life plea and avoided a death sentence.
Rome); 327 F.3d at 342. Because Rowsey produced no evidence to demonstrate a discriminatory
intent on the part of the prosecution and the prosecution produced substantial evidence showing
Rowsey's guilt, the court declined to issue a CDA for that claim. Id at 343. That claim will not be
discussed further in this case note.
21. Suiser, 325 F.3d at 228; Rousey, 327 F.3d at 339; sev 28 USC S 2253(c)(1)(A) (2000)
(stating that unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability an applicant maynot
appeal "the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises
out of process issued bya State court"; part of AEDPA); FED. R. APP.P. 22(b) (1) (stating that when
an applicant files a notice of appeal, the district judge who rendered the decision must either issue
acertificate of apalabltyor state whya certificate should not issue"); 4THOR. R. 22(a)(3) (stating
that a ODA shall issue if any judge of a three judge panel finds that a petitioner has made the
showing required by28 US.C S 2253(c)).
22. 28 U.S.C § 2253(c)(2) (stating that for a certificate of appealabilkyto issue, the applicant
must make a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right"; part of AEDPA).
23. 529 US. 473 (2000).
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proceed further.' "24 Likewise, when the district court rejects a petitioner's
habeas petition on procedural grounds, without reaching the underlying constitu-
tional claim, the court of appeals may only issue a GOA upon a showing that
"jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim
of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling."2" In
Miller-El v Goden,26 the United States Supreme Court insisted that appellate
courts not "sidestepl]" the process for issuing a COA by denying an appeal on
the merits and then using that denial as a justification for not issuing a COA.
The Court held that when appellate courts used such reasoning to deny a CDA,
they were essentially "deciding an appeal without jurisdiction.""
The Fourth Circuit heard arguments m both Rouwey and Suisher before the
Supreme Court announced its decision in Miller-El, but it issued both decisions
after Mikr-El?9 In Suiser, the court noted that "[t]he current posture of this
appeal, in which we are called on to determine whether to issue a GDA as to
issues which have been fully briefed and argued before the panel, is thus out of
step with the procedural treatment that the Supreme Court has indicated is
appropriate for COA applications under S 2253 (c)."30 Nonetheless, in both cases
the court applied the standard found in S 2253(c) and Sladk as directed byMiUer-
EL
31
B. It xfiwAssistavcx rf~ d
1. Swisher
During the penalty phase of Swisher's trial, Ridgeway testified that he had
heard Swisher sayhe felt he could "do it again." 32 Ridgewayhad previously told
24. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 US. 473, 483-84 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880, 893 n.4 (1983)).
25. Id at 484.
26. 537 U.S. 322 (2003).
27. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 US. 322, 336-37 (2003) (forbidding courts of appeals from
deciding the merits of an appeal and using that decision to determine whether to grant an applica-
tion for a CXA).
28. Id In his concurrence, Justice Scalia pointed to two such cases in the prior year alone,
Kasi v. Angelone, 300 F.3d 487 (4th CAr. 2002) and Wheat v. Johnson, 238 F3d 357 (5th Cr. 2001),
in which the respective appellate courts decided an appeal without jurisdiction. Id at 348-49 (Scalia,
J., concurring); s aiso Lyons v. Lee, 316 F.3d 528, 530 (4th Cr. 2003) (declining to issue a COA
afterexamining the merits of the appeal);Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306,308 (4th Cr. 2003) (same);
Janice L. Kopec, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF.J. 467 (2003) (analyzing Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306
(4th Cr. 2003) and Lyons v. Lee 316 F.3d 528 (4th CGr. 2003)).
29. Miller.E, 537 U.S. at 322; Rowe% 327 F.3d at 335; Stishe, 325 F.3d at 225.
30. Suisher, 325 F.3d at 230.
31. Id; RomeK 327 F.3d at 340.
32. Swiher, 325 F.3d at 227.
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the police he did not remember hearing such a statement from Swisher himself,
but that Shane Knous remembered hearing Swisher sayhe felt like he could "do
it again."" Swisher argued that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
neglecting to cross-examine Ridgeway about the discrepancy between his testi-
mony and his statement to the police.3"
The district court applied Stnd/klad v WashPVW' and denied Swisher
habeas relief. 6 The district court determined that Swisher's counsel's perfor-
mances were not objectivelyunreasonable and that the juryheard sufficient other
evidence of both vileness and future dangerousness (physical evidence of the
crime, Swisher's confession, discovery of a "shank" and razor blade in Swisher's
cell, and Swisher's repeated threats to jailers) to support the ultimate sentence."
The Fourth Grcuit found that, in light of the evidence presented to the jury
outside of Ridgeway's testimony, reasonable jurists would not find the district
court's ruling debatable and denied Swisher's application for a COA.3"
2. Rowsey
Rowsey argued that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to
object to the judge's jury poll questioning of Eleanor Leath ("Leath") or to ask
for clarification of her response. 9 After the jury foreman delivered the recom-
mendation of a sentence of death, the judge polled the juryto determine if each
member assented to the sentence. ° Leath became emotional and was unable to
respond to the judge's questions. 1 After being asked three times whether she
agreed with the sentence, Leath voiced her assent on the fourth questioning.42
33. Id at 227-28.
34. Id at 231.
35. 466 US. 668 (1984).
36. Smiher, 325 F.3d at 232; se Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-91 (1984)
(holding that to support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show the
following: (1) counsels performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and outside
the wide range of professional compeIency and (2) the performance prejudiced the defense in that
if counsel had met the professional standards, the result of the proceeding would have been
different).
37. Suisher, 325 F.3d at 232. Under Virgia statutory law, before a death sentence is
imposed, the court orju must either find a probabiliyof future dangerousness or that defendant's
conduct in the course of the crime was "outrageously or wantonly vile." VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-
264.2 (Mlchie 2000). In Swisher's case, the jury found that the Commonwealth proved both
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Suiskar, 325 F.3d at 232 n.8.
38. Susher, 325 F.3d at 232.
39. Rome.% 327 F.3d at 343.





Four years later, Leath swore in an affidavit that she did not intend to assent to
the sentence."3
The Fourth Circuit found, based on the transcript of the proceeding alone,
that counsel's failure to object was not unreasonable." The court noted that the
trial judge went to great pains to ascertain Leath's intent and that her assent to
the verdict was clear and unambiguous." The court gave Leath's affidavit little
weight and noted the dangers of basing a decision on a juror's recollections years
after the fact, particularly when the juror's response to the poll on the day in
question was uncontroverted. ' Given these circumstances, the court decided
that Rowsey's counsel did not act unreasonably by failing to object to the judge's
questioning of Leath and declined to issue a (OA on that claim."'
C Ahrmiura D9 6ad iPeaywai Thunn'ry
Swisher also argued that by eliciting false testimony from Ridgeway and
failing to correct the impression it created, the Commonwealth violated his
Fourteenth Amendment rights.4 Because Swisher did not raise this claim at trial
or on direct appeal, but in the state habeas proceedings, the Supreme Court of
Virginia determined that the claim was procedurally defaulted.4 Swisher failed
to "show cause and prejudice to overcome his procedural default," and the
district court therefore denied his claim. ° Swisher argued that he had shown
cause because by the very act of using the testimony, the Commonwealth pur-
posely obscured its falsity.". Therefore, government officials' actions interfered
with Swisher's abilityto complywith state procedural rules." The Fourth Crcuit
observed that the basis for Swisher's perjury claim was the disparity between
Ridgeway's statement to the police and his testimony at trial, both of which were
43. Id at 343.
44. Id at 344.
45. RawP e 327 F.3d at 344-45.
46. Id
47. Id
48. Suisher, 325 F.3d at 230 (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 US. 264,269 (1959) and Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972)); se US. COMT. amend. XIV (guaranteeing due process
of law). In Nae, the Court stated that convictions obtained by soliciting false evidence, or failing
to correct the erroneous impression it creates at trial, may not stand. Nap, 360 US. at 269. In
G~iA the Court noted "that deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of
known false evidence is incompatible with rudimentarydemands of justice." G% 405 U.S. at 153
(citation omitted).
49. Suisler, 325 F.3d at 230.
50. Id
51. Id
52. Id at 230-31 (citing Mcleskeyv. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,494 (1991) (holding that officials'




in Swisher's possession."3 The court determined that reasonable jurists would
agree that government interference had not impinged upon Swisher's ability to
discover Ridgeway's alleged perjurybecause Swisher possessed Ridgeway's initial
statement all along.-'
Alternatively, Swisher argued that his counsel's failure to challenge the
testimony constituted ineffective assistance of counsel that explained his proce-
dural default."5 While ineffective assistance of counsel may establish cause for
procedural default because it is an independent constitutional claim, it is also
subject to the requirement of exhaustion in state court.5 6 Swisher failed to assert
this ineffective assistance of counsel claimin a timelymanner and did not explain
this failure. 7 Therefore, the court held that reasonable jurists would not debate
the district court's finding that Swisher's ineffective assistance of counsel excuse
for his procedural default was itself procedurallydefaulted.m Because no reason-
able jurists could debate the insufficiency of either of Swisher's explanations for
his procedural default, the Fourth Circuit declined to issue a CDM 9
D. Brady Viiatiom
Swisher asserted that the Commonwealth's failure to disclose that Ridgeway
sought and received a reward in exchange for his testimony violated Brady u
Mar Although Swisher also procedurally defaulted this claim, the district
court denied it on the merits pursuant to 28 U.S.C S 2254(b)(2)." The district
court concluded that in light of the strength of the evidence before the jury
outside of Ridgeways testimony, if Swisher's counsel had been able to impeach
Ridgewaythrough the evidence requested, no juror would have likely voted for
life 6 The Fourth Circuit decided that no reasonable jurists could debate the
results of the district court's determination.63
53. Id
54. Id
55. Sisher, 325 F3d at 231.
56. Id at 231 (citing Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451-52 (2000) and Murray v.




60. Id at 232; se Brady v. Maryland, 373 US. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that "the suppression
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishnmnt").
61. Suiher, 325 F3d at 232-33 (citing 28 US.C S 2254(b)(2) (2000)).
62. Id at 233 (citing Jfn, 311 F3d at 314 n.4 (finding that to establish a Brady claim, a
defendant must show a reasonable probability that the results of the proceedings would have been





Rowsey argued that the trial judge's partiality and bias against him violated
his due process rights.64 Rowsey alleged that nineteen statements from the trial
judge reflected an unconstitutional bias.6' Among the statements, the trial judge
said that the victim "was gay and the defendant was probably a latent homosex-
ual," if the jurysentenced the defendant to death the defendant should "be taken
from the courthouse to the Circle K where the murder occurred, shot six times
and stomped in the head," and if individual voir dire was granted the judge
"would go back to Durham and wait three weeks and [counsel should] call him
when theywere through."' None of these statements were made in the presence
of the jury.67
In Litdeyv UnitedState,68 the United States Supreme Court held that judicial
bias amounted to a denial of due process onlywhen an appellant showed that the
bias made "fair judgment impossible." 69 "'Opinions formed bythe judge do not
constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they displayed a deep-
seated favoritismor antagonism....'" "- "'E]ixpressions of impatience, dissatis-
faction, annoyance, and even anger," do not constitute judicial bias."1 The state
MAR court found that the comments did not impact the fairness of the trial and
the federal district court upheld that ruling.72 Because the Fourth Crcuit found
that reasonable jurists could debate the district court's assessment of the effect
of the trial judge's comments, the Fourth Crcuit issued a COAP
Upon issuing a GOA, the Fourth Circuit was bound to examine the MAR
court's ruling to determine whether it was "contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law." 4 Although this standard of
review is higher than the initial GOA inquiry, the clearly established federal law
to be applied was still the L ivey standard."5 The Court of Appeals determined
that because the jury adjudicated Rowsey's guilt and fixed the penalty, to succeed
on his claim, Rowsey needed to show that either the judge's alleged bias influ-
64. Rome) 327 F.3d at 341.
65. Id
66. Id
67. Id at 341-42.
68. 510 U.S. 540 (1994).
69. Litekyv. United States, 510 U.S. 540,555 (1994) (holding that to establish judicial bias
the appellant must show a deep seated favoritism or antagonism rendering fair judgment impossi-
ble).
70. Romeg 327 F.3d at 341 (quoting LitSk 510 US. at 555) (alteration in original).
71. Id (quoting L&ydiS 510 US. at 555-56).
72. Id at 342.
73. Id at 341.
74. Id (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 US. 362, 367 (2000)).
75. Id at 341-42.
202 (Vol. 16:1
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enced the jury or that the judge made rulings against Rowsey that demonstrated
a deep seated bias." The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that some
of the trial judge's comments "push[ed] private judicial commentaryto its ethical
limit."' However, the Fourth Circuit found that the judge made all of the alleged
improper comments outside the presence of the jury and the judge ruled in favor
of Rowsey several times." Rowseyalso claimed that the judge displayed his bias
by overruling Rowsey's objection against introducing his prior record as mitigat-
ing evidence.79 The Fourth CArcuit agreed with the Supreme Court of North
Carolina that the trial judge was required to admit the prior record because a
reasonable juror could view the prior record as a mitigating circumstance because
the record consisted of mostly property crimes, contained no felonies, and
showed Rowsey did not have a serious criminal history." Consequently, the
Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's determination that the state MAR
court's ruling was neither contraryto, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law."1
F. Inpamitn f a Dt Sen on a Nonavarmznr Vendt
Finally, Rowseyargued that because juror Leath did not intend to assent to
the verdict, the state violated its own process by sentencing Rowsey to death
without first obtaining a unanimous jury verdict. 2 The Fourth Circuit agreed
with the Supreme Court of North Carolina and the district court that the trial
judge's questioning of Leath was proper and that she freely assented to the
verdict!3 Although Rowsey requested an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the
only new evidence he produced to indicate that the verdict was not unanimous
was Leath's affidavit." The court found the claim "wholly without merit and
decline[d] to issue a (OA." s
76. Romi!% 327 F.3d at 342.
77. Id at 341.
78. Id at 341-42.
79. Id at 342. Under North Carolina law, a judge must submit all evidence that might
support a mtigat circumstance to the jury, even over a defendant's objection. See N.C GEN.
STAT. S 15A-2000(b (requiring the judge to instruct the jury to consider mitigating evidence when
determining the appropriateness of a capital sentence); State v. Ingle, 445 S.E.2d 880,893-94 (N.C
1994) (stating that if the defendant's prior criminal historyis relatively insignificant, the judge must
submit the record to the jury as mitigating evidence).
80. RomeK 327 F.3d at 342.
81. Id
82. Id at 345; so N.C GEN. STAT. S 15A-2000(b) (2001) (requiring a death sentence to be
supported by a unanimous jury verdict).
83. Romey, 327 F.3d at 345.
84. Id
85. Id Perhaps Rowsey based this claim on a violation of due process; the opinion does not
clarify the basis for this caim.
2003]
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IV. Applzdn i Vnva
Suws/her and Roeseyprovide the practitioner with some indication of how the
Fourth Circuit will follow the procedural requirements established by the Su-
preme Court in Miller-EL First, throughout most of both cases the Fourth
Circuit appeared to heed the Supreme Court's admonition against deciding an
appeal on its merits and using the result to justify denying a 0DA. However, at
the end of Rowey, the Fourth Circuit appeared to slide back into that disfavored
practice by declining to issue a OA because the claims were "wholly without
merit." 6 Apparently, the Fourth Crcuit will not specify that reasonable jurists
could find a decision debatable when the decision appealed leaves nothing to
debate; after all, reasonable jurists would all agree that a claim wholly without
merit was properlydismissed. This finding suggests that in some class of appeals
the merits of the appeal will be so obvious that even a first examination of the
application will reveal that the appeal is both without merit and beyond reason-
able debate.
Rowey and Suisher also indicate, however, that the procedural standard the
Supreme Court insisted on inMiler.Elmayimpact the Fourth Crcuit's decision
to issue a COA in other appeals. The two cases illustrate that the standard for
granting a COA will be daunting. Of the several issues appealed in those cases,
the only one for which a (OA was granted was Rowsey's judicial bias claim,
based in part on comments that pushed "private judicial commentary to its
ethical limit."87 To the extent that the Fourth Ccuit has fleshed out the proce-
dural demands of Miller-El in these cases, it has done so in a demanding way.
The denial of an application for a (GOA by the district court places the
practitioner in an awkward situation. Miller-El plainly requires a two-step pro-
cess, first an application for a COA and, if granted, a briefing on the merits."
The two documents would have considerable overlap in factual and procedural
material. Certainly, the more efficient method is to combine them in one docu-
ment. Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit appears to follow the Supreme Court's
directive that the "issuance of a (DA must not be profmu or a matter of
course." 9 Because of the apparent difficulty applicants will likelyhave in obtain-
ing a COA, an applicant should include as much material as possible in the
application for a OA because, as these cases illustrate, the application for a
GOA may be the applicant's only chance to be heard at the appellate level.
Rousey sheds some light on how to proceed with a hesitant juror during a
jury poll. The practitioner must choose between objecting to the way in which
86. Id
87. Id at 341.
88. Midll.E, 537 U.S. at 335-36.
89. Id at 337.
[Vol. 16:1
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the jury poll is conducted or remaining silent and hoping for postconviction
relief. Romey indicated that in all likelihood no postconviction relief will be
forthcoming from the Fourth Ccuit if the judge can extract an assent from a
juror? Given the result in Hwmrt v Qnrxmal1t, 9' a Virginia appellate court
might be more sympathetic to such a claim.92 An important fact in Hunkt was
that a hesitant juror cried and said she "[could not] sayit" before assenting to the
verdict.9 Absent extreme circumstances like those in Hwrhi& the appellate
courts are unlikely to overturn a conviction. Therefore, the best strategy to
pursue, if faced with a hesitant juror, is to ask the judge to repoll the jury. If the
judge repolls the jury, and the juror refuses to assent, then the result is a
nonunanimous death verdict upon which the judge must impose life.94 If the
juror manifests his or her assent to the verdict, then a practitioner has not lost
anything after Roruey and Hwnirt.
Suisher reminds the practitioner that all ineffective assistance of counsel
claims should be made as quicklyas possible. The Fourth Crcuit held in Bwket
v A ro s that ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise a claim at trial
or on direct appeal may provide cause to excuse the procedural default.9 The
Fourth Crcuit in Swsher found that Swisher's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel to excuse his procedural default was itself procedurallydefaulted because
he did not raise it at his first opportunity.97 Consequently, counsel hoping to use
the rule announced in Bwkeet must do so in the state habeas proceeding, or else
the claim that ineffective assistance of counsel excuses a procedural default will
be itself defaulted.98
Suisher also reminds the practitioner that ineffective assistance of counsel
claims should be made with as much particularity as possible. Swisher's claim
that his counsel ineffectivelycross-examined Ridgewaywas not broad enough to
90. Rome% 327 F.3d at 343-45.
91. 514 SE2d 804 (Va. C. App. 1999).
92. Humbert v. Commonwealth, 514 SE.2d 804, 809-10 (Va. C. App. 1999) (holding that
when a judge repeatedlyprodded a juxyto reach a verdict, jurors expressed belief that a unanimous
verdict was impossible before the judge ordered them to further deliberate, and a juror became
upset, cried, and said she "[could not) say it" before finally assenting to the verdict, the verdict was
not unanimous).
93. Id
94. VA. CODE ANN. S 192-264.4(E) (MicIhie Supp. 2003) (stating that if a jurycannot reach
unanimity regarding the penalty, the judge must dismiss the jury and impose a life sentence).
95. 208 F.3d 172 (4th Cr. 2000).
96. Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172,189 (4th Cir. 2000) (ruling that because defendant had
a constitutional right to assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal, ineffective assistance of counsel
may excuse a procedural default on another claim).
97. Ssher, 325 F.3d at 231.




encompass his claim that his counsel's ineffectiveness for not claiming the State
knowingly elicited perjured testimony excused his procedural default." There-
fore, counsel should plead each and every ineffective assistance of counsel claim
as precisely as possible at the earliest possible stage of the proceedings.
V. Cacwaion
For the first time, the Fourth Circuit seriously engaged the procedural step
of the appeals process that requires an appellant to receive a GOA before the
court entertains the appeal on the merits. The standard that appears to emerge
from that engagement is lofty. Moreover, obtaining a COA, of course, is no
guarantee that the decision on the merits will be favorable.
VI. Epilo
At 9:05 p.m. on July 22, 2003, Bobby Wayne Swisher was executed at the
Greensville Correctional Center."° In his final statement he said, "I hope you all
can find the same peace in Jesus Christ as I have." 1' The execution had been set
for July 1, 2003, but Governor Mark Warner delayed the execution in order to
give Swisher a final chance to appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia for a new
sentencing proceeding. 2 Swisher argued that the jury used a verdict form later
found bythe Supreme Court of Virginia to be defective.' 3 The court denied his
appeal on what Swisher's attorney described as procedural grounds.'04
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